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Comments
Life-Term Inmates' Right to Procreate Via Artificial




Bringing a child into the world should be cause for joy rather than legal
action; however it is a repeatedly litigated area under many different
circumstances. In a world of rapidly developing reproductive technology,
individuals are able to procreate via artificial insemination with as little as a
plastic cup and access to overnight mail.' While artificial insemination has
existed for quite some time, the technology surrounding the practice has become
more simplified, providing those who are unable to utilize the traditional methods
of procreation with a means of exercising one of our most basic human rights!
When prisoners' rights are at issue, few want to legitimize or permit an
inmate to experience more than "three hots and a cot," let alone father a child.'• 4
Society in general is unsympathetic to prisoners and their rights. When courts
interpret the law to expand prisoners' rights, there is always some skepticism.'
While there fails to be overwhelming support for laws making it easier for
prisoners to father children, infringement upon a prisoner's fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution should not be tolerated simply because of
societal distaste.6
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2003; B.A., Political
Science, University of California, Davis, 1997. I dedicate this comment to my family and friends whose love
and support means the world to me. Thank you to Professor Mary-Beth Moylan, Teresa L. Zuber, and the entire
McGeorge Law Review staff for their valuable feedback during the writing and editing process. Finally, to my
father, Robert J. Harrington, who inspired me to study law and whose strength and wisdom does not go
unnoticed.
1. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1077, 1081-82 (1998) (discussing the procedures involved and the constitutional status of assisted
reproduction, including artificial insemination technology).
2. See Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8 ALB. L.J.
SC. & TECH. 1, 23-25 (1997) (describing the procedure involved in artificial insemination and its
development).
3. See William Glaberson, Skepticism Follows Court Ruling in Favor of Inmate Procreation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at A7 (expressing criticisms of the Ninth Circuit's liberal ruling to provide a means of
procreation to a life-term inmate).
4. See CNN Burden Of Proof (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 7, 2001) (discussing policy views behind
prisoner's rights).
5. See Glaberson, supra note 3, at A7 (addressing the debate over whether prisoners should be allowed
to father children while behind bars).
6. See generally Katz, supra note 2, at 47-48 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to address a
question involving reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN
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Prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections because of their
conviction and confinement in prison] Incarceration does not automatically
extinguish all aspects of an inmate's constitutional rights.8 Inevitably, prisoners
do lose certain rights.9 When they do, there must be legitimate justifications for
depriving inmates of their fundamental rights. 0
Recently, the Ninth Circuit released an en banc opinion ruling that certain
prisoners should not be permitted to father children. 1 In a narrow six-to-five
decision, the court held that procreation via artificial insemination is
"fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration." 2 Gerber v. Hickman is the first
case in which a federal appellate court has been faced with the question of
whether a life-term prisoner's wife may be artificially inseminated with her
incarcerated husband's sperm. 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision affirms a now two-
year-old U.S. District Court opinion and overturns a September 2001
unprecedented decision by a three judge Ninth Circuit panel finding a right to
procreate while incarcerated. 14
Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor any other lower court, has
resolved the circumstances presented in Gerber. While it is argued that "the
law, as well as common sense, recognizes that individuals who commit serious
crimes forfeit many rights that law-abiding citizens enjoy," questions remain as
OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 170 (1994) (forwarding the idea that
"control over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of
one's life.").
7. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
8. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that activities such as
procreation, conjugal visits, and childbirth are not "inherently inconsistent" with an individual's status as a
prisoner); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (claiming that an Oklahoma statute, which
provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals, "runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause"); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (asserting that prison inmates retain those constitutional rights that are not
inconsistent with their prisoner status); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1407 (8th Cir. 1990) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[n]either prisons nor courts should deny a reasonable request for the exercise of a
constitutional right simply because it is novel.").
9. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890 (discussing retained rights in accordance with legitimate penological
objectives); see generally Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Marriage, Procreation and the Prisoner: Should
Reproductive Alternatives Survive During Incarceration?, 5 TOURO L. REV. 189, 189-90 (1988) (explaining the
Supreme Court's views on rights retained by prisoners during incarceration).
10. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 885 (noting institutional concerns such as conserving prisoner resources,
maintaining institutional security, and preserving prisoner rehabilitation).
11. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cit. 2002), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 16, 2002) (No.
02-419).
12. Id. at 619.
13. See Denny Walsh, Inmate Loses Plea to Father a Child, The Ninth Circuit Court Rules Prisoners
Have No Right to Procreate, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, May 24, 2002, at A3 (reporting the Court's decision that
"certain prison inmates should be stripped of their constitutional right to father children.").
14. See id. (noting the case's subsequent history before it was referred to an enlarged panel of eleven
circuit judges in December 2001).
15. See Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2002) [hereinafter Recent Case] (noting that
"[clonstitutionally permissible restrictions on conjugal visits have historically rendered this issue moot").
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to whether that position makes sense when certain inmates are allowed intimate
contact visits with their loved ones.16
On en banc review of Gerber, five dissenting judges failed to see the harm in
permitting an inmate to ejaculate into a plastic cup and to mail the sample to the
lab. 7 The dissents argued that artificial insemination "implicates none of the
restrictions on privacy and association that are necessary attributes of incarceration." 8
The dissent also focused on the role of the Legislature determining of whether
prisoners' procreative rights should be restricted in this manner. 9
At present, prison officials have the power to impose limitations on a
prisoner's fundamental right to procreate by presenting "legitimate penological
interests. '  As modem technology develops, enabling prisoners to procreate via
artificial insemination with arguably minimal burdens upon penological
objectives, the law governing an inmate's right to procreate may become less
clear." While a prison sentence may constitutionally deprive an inmate of liberty
to the extent that he may be confined and subjected to the rules of the prison
system, courts should not allow unsubstantiated prison objectives to act as a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." An
individual's "[p]ersonal choices concerning marriage, procreation, contraception,
child rearing, and abortion, comprise privacy zones that courts shelter against
unjustified governmental interference."23 Without careful analysis by the courts
of legitimate penological objectives set forth by prison administrators to restrict
the procreative rights of inmates, there is a risk that those restrictions may not be
constitutionally sound. 4
At an absolute minimum, artificial insemination requests should be addressed
individually rather than be subject to a complete ban. 5 A complete prohibition on
artificial insemination requests by life-term inmates leaves those prisoners
permanently unable to exercise the right to procreate, while the burden of
16. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 617.
17. See id. at 624-25 (presenting Judge Tashima's dissenting opinion).
18. See id. at 625 (same).
19. See id. at 630-31 (presenting Judge Kozinski's separate dissenting opinion).
20. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
96-97 (1987)).
21. See generally Katz, supra note 2, at 23 (addressing the development of modern reproductive
technologies including artificial insemination).
22. Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890-91; see generally Turner v. Safley, 42 U.S. 78 (1987) (establishing a
standard of review for prison regulations).
23. See Kristin M. Davis, Inmates and Artificial Insemination: A New Perspective on Prisoners'
Residual Right to Procreate, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 166-67 (1993) (discussilng the right of
privacy protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1407 (8th Cir. 1990) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (stressing
that failure to show a legitimate penological objective behind denying a request deprives prisoners of their
fundamental constitutional rights).
25. See id. (pointing to flaws in the prison's blanket prohibition on inmate requests for artificial
insemination).
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accommodating the request would be slight." Considering inmate requests on a
case-by-case basis would impose negligible costs on the prison and permit
prisoners to exercise their fundamental procreative rights in situations where the
exercise would not conflict with prison security or other institutional concerns."
The Supreme Court has addressed the importance of exploring alternatives that
accommodate constitutional rights in this way . Clearly, the Court favors policies
that do not absolutely deny a constitutional right to prisoners.29
This Comment will present the interesting story of life-term inmate, William
Reno Gerber, and his loving and dedicated wife, Evelyn, and their battle with the
courts to recognize a prisoner's right to artificial insemination. A brief overview
of recent case law concerning a prisoner's right to artificial insemination is
necessary to tell this most despairing tale from behind prison walls. Next, this
Comment will examine the standard of review used to evaluate prisoners' claims
alleging infringement of a fundamental constitutional right."' Subsequently, this
Comment will look critically at typical "legitimate penological objectives"
advanced by prison officials in prisoner rights cases, specifically those involving
procreative rights.3' In the process, it will address the policy issues surrounding a
prisoner's procreative rights that warrant further consideration by the United
States Supreme Court, or perhaps more appropriately, the California Legislature.
II. A PRISONER AND HIS WIFE AND OTHER STORIES
William Reno Gerber, a forty-three-year-old California inmate, is serving a
"three strikes" sentence of one hundred years to life plus eleven years at Mule
32Creek State Prison. Mr. Gerber and his wife requested permission from the
California Department of Corrections to mail a semen sample to a Chicago
laboratory to allow them to conceive a child.33 The couple intends to bear all the
26. See id. (stating that if an inmate's particular request would cause undue burden to the facility's
resources, the request could be denied on that basis).
27. See id. (noting that granting an inmate a right in one case does not mean that every request should be
permitted).
28. See Irah H. Donner, Comment, Goodwin v. Turner: Cons and Pro-Creating, 41 CASE W. RES. 999,
1007 (1991) (citing to the Supreme Court decision in Turner).
29. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Skinner which overturned legislation requiring
sterilization of certain inmates).
30. See infra Part IV (focusing on the Turner standard used by courts to review prison regulations).
31. See infra Part III (identifying and examining recent case law involving a prisoner's right to
procreate).
32. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant at 27, Gerber v. Hickman, No. 02-419,
(Aug. 16, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that Mr. Gerber's sentence is one
hundred years to life plus eleven years for discharging a firearm into his own television set under California's
three strikes law). Mr. Gerber's prior convictions involved an armed burglary at the age of seventeen and
another incident involving a firearm during his twenties.) Mr. Gerber's third-strike occurred "[aipproximately
[fourteen] years after his only felony conviction as an adult." Id.
33. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619-20 (providing Mr. Gerber's initial list of requests as background within
the Court's en bane opinion).
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costs related to their request. 4 The warden, Rodney Hickman, denied that
request.35
With the odds stacked against them, the Gerbers chose to fight their battle in
the federal courts and will continue to fight for not only Mr. Gerber's rights but
the rights of other inmates similarly situated, facing the same restrictions on
procreation. The Gerbers pursued their dream to conceive a child after Mr.
Gerber's incarceration by using appropriate legal channels, as required by prison
regulations." The Gerbers have not requested conjugal visitation rights or
intimate association.
With the increased use of DNA technology, prisoners are able to submit
DNA samples of blood, tissue, and semen in hopes of reopening their case toS39
prove their innocence. If Mr. Gerber had committed crimes in which DNA was
a factor and wanted to submit a sperm sample in order to prove his innocence,
prison officials most likely would grant his request. n° The process of DNA
sample collection is identical to what is involved in semen collection for artificial
insemination.4' The only difference is that the sample in the Gerbers' case would
enable a life-term inmate to father a child.
While the California Department of Corrections permits conjugal visits for
inmates who have a parole date, Gerber's sentence is so lengthy that hopes of a
parole date are slim to none.42 By allowing some inmates to have conjugal visits,
questions arise as to whether procreation is truly inconsistent with incarceration.
A prisoner's procreative rights are "too important to be abrogated based on
nothing more than the personal opinion of prison bureaucrats that we would be
34. See id. at 619 (quoting Mr. Gerber that "all costs associated therewith, including any costs incurred
by the CDC" (California Department of Corrections), would be borne by the Gerbers).
35. Id.
36. Telephone Interview with Teresa L. Zuber, Law Offices of Teresa L. Zuber, Attorney for the
Plaintiff, William Reno Gerber (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter Zuber Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
37. Id.
38. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619-20.
39. See id. at 625-26 (pointing out that the "[w]arden has conceded that he could not prevent prisoners
from sending samples of body fluids to a forensic laboratory in order to establish their innocence."). The Court
further notes, "Gerber's request involves essentially the same procedure." Id.
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant at 20, Gerber v. Hickman, No. 02-419, (Aug.
16, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (pointing to the record from the motion to dismiss
which establishes that Gerber's request is no different from an inmate mailing a sample of bodily fluids to prove
innocence or to obtain an independent diagnosis of disease).
41. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENr OF JUSTICE, CAL-DNA FACT SHEEr, Mar. 2001 at 3 [hereinafter
CAL-DNA FACT SHEEr] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the majority of DNA
collection kits used by inmates "are submitted to labs via U.S. mail, with the remainder being delivered
personally").
42. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619 (citing Title 15, section 3174(e)(2) of the California Code of
Regulations as "[t]he California Department of Corrections (CDC) prohibits family visits for inmates
'sentenced to life without the possibility of parole [or] sentenced to life, without a parole date established by the
Board of Prison Terms."').
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better off as a society if the Gerbers were prevented from parenting" a child of
43their own.
While the Gerbers have fought using the justice system, other prisoners and
their spouses have resorted to other means of procreating via artificial
insemination." Cases of sperm smuggling and bribery have begun to surface
because of strict prison regulations.45 Labeled as the "newest Mafia trend," sperm
smuggling proves to be a fast and effective means for inmates to start the family
they had always hoped for on the outside.46
Mobster Kevin Granato, sentenced to twenty-three years in prison, remains
in solitary confinement until he explains to prison authorities how he fathered a
child with his wife while behind bars.47 While Granato and his wife remain silent
as to the details, there are many theories as to how Granato's sperm was
smuggled outside prison walls. 4' Some believe Granato used materials that were
easily obtained inside the prison, such as plastic bags or food wrap. 49 Another
theory is that Granato used a hand ball, common in prison recreation areas, split
it down the middle to secure a sample contained within a plastic bag or wrap,
which was then thrown over the prison fence and retrieved by a third party who
delivered it to his wife's doctor. ° Despite the tricky logistics, doctors were able
to successfully inseminate Granato's wife with the smuggled sperm sample.5'
New Jersey mobster Antonio Parlavecchio would not let incarceration
prevent him from fathering a child with his wife via artificial insemination.52 In
1998, Parlavecchio bribed guards to bring him a cryogenic sperm kit.53 Later,
another guard smuggled the kit out and transported it to a fertility clinic. 4 Once
43. See id. at 632 (presenting Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion).
44. See United States v. Parlavecchio, 192 F. Supp. 2d 349 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (presenting a case involving
a conspiracy between an inmate's wife and a correctional officer to smuggle the inmate's seminal fluid outside
the federal prison in order for the inmate's wife to be artificially inseminated).
45. id.
46. Greg B. Smith, Mobster Has on His Face in Sperm Scam, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 15, 2000,
at 7; see also ABC 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 26, 2002) [hereinafter ABC 20/20 Broadcast] (noting
that mobster involvement in sperm smuggling is "a way of putting something over on the feds" while behind
bars).
47. See ABC 20/20 Broadcast, supra note 46 (reporting that Granato was questioned and later placed
into solitary confinement, consisting of a twenty-three hour lockdown, no visitors, and one phone call per




51. See id. (reporting that the investigation of the Granatos began in 1999 after Mrs. Granato brought
their newborn daughter to prison visitation sessions); Murray Weiss, Mafia Baby Barred -Mob Wife Protests
Jail Ban on Visits to Sperm-Smuggle Hubby, N.Y. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at 9 (noting that Mr. Granato had been
imprisoned since 1988 on changes of murder and racketeering).
52. Smith, supra note 46; see United States v. Parlavecchio, 192 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (M.D. Pa. 2002)
(denying Maria Parlavecchio's post-conviction motion for return of semen illegally obtained from her
incarcerated husband).
53. Smith, supra note 46.
54. Id.
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investigators learned of Parlavecchio's scheme to conceive a child via artificial
insemination, authorities seized his seminal fluid from the fertility clinic to
prevent the procedure from occurring.55 Often prison officials are unaware that
sperm has been smuggled until a child attends family visitation sessions within
the prison facility.56 In some cases, the prisoner will face additional punishment
unless he agrees to help investigators or name his accomplices.57 Investigators
continue to monitor this trend, but, unsurprisingly, not too many mobster inmates
are willing to talk. 8
Other inmates, both in California and across the Nation, have brought claims
to secure their right to procreation through artificial insemination or conjugal
visitation. All of their claims were denied. In Goodwin v. Turner, Steven
Goodwin was a federal prisoner set to be released in 1995. Goodwin sought
permission to transport semen to his wife for the purposes of artificial
insemination. In Goodwin's case, his short prison term would allow him the
opportunity to exercise his procreative rights with his wife upon his release from
prison.
In Anderson v. Vasquez, 9 fourteen death row inmates housed at San Quentin
alleged infringement of their constitutional right to procreate by prohibiting them
conjugal visitation or access to artificial insemination. While similar to the
Gerber case in that the inmates were serving life terms, the circumstances of the
death row inmates behind the claim were not.6° Many of the Anderson plaintiffs
already had children, while others were not even married.6' Many of the plaintiffs
were sentenced to death row for heinously violent crimes involving killing or
endangering children. 6' One of the inmates killed two of his own children in a
custody dispute with his wife.63 Another stabbed his two young nephews after
they witnessed him rape and attempt to kill their mother. 6' Another plaintiff
55. Parlavecchio, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
56. ABC 20/20 Broadcast, supra note 46.
57. See id. (reporting that Kevin Granato was held in solitary confinement for almost two years for
refusing to name who conspired with him to smuggle sperm outside the prison to his wife).
58. Id.
59. Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
60. See Rita Lane Medellin, Anderson v. State of California: Do Death Row Inmates Have a
Fundamental Right to Procreate Through Conjugal Visits And/Or Artificial Insemination?, 14 CRIM. JUST. J.
425 (1992) (commenting on the lawsuit filed by a group of death row inmates serving life terms in California).
61. See id. at 427 (noting that some were requesting further procreative privileges with wives,
girlfriends, and in one instance, use of a surrogate mother).
62. See id. at 428 (stating that "[at] least six of the [fourteen] Anderson plaintiffs have violent histories
involving the killing or endangering of children."). The article relates six detailed stories of various plaintiffs'
criminal activities. Id.
63. See id. (describing plaintiff Herbert J. Coddington's reaction to his children living with their own
mother).
64. See id. (telling the story of plaintiff Randy Haskett, whose nephews were ages four and ten years
old). Their mother was Haskett's stepsister. Id.
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assaulted a woman with a baseball bat, raped her, and set her on fire in front of
her five-year-old daughter.65
Now Mr. Gerber sits, childless, in a California prison for the rest of his life.
His imprisonment stems from an incident that occurred in his own home without
any family members present.6 Although none of his prior convictions involved
bodily harm to anyone, California's three-strikes law required a life-term for his
act of discharging a firearm into his television set.67 His status as a life-term
prisoner may have cost the Gerbers their right to bring a biological child into
their marriage.
III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE BEHIND BARS?
The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental constitutional right to
procreate in both the prison context and elsewherei5 For non-prisoners, the
Supreme Court has recognized the right to procreate both in conjunction with
marital rights and as a separate privilege.w Generally, the right to privacy
supports the assertion of a right to procreate. 7° Although not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution, courts have recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental
right.7' The right to privacy stems from personal liberty protected under the
Constitution." Accordingly, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, a case involving prisoners,
the court determined the right to procreate not only important, but a "basic,
fundamental civil liberty." However, the Supreme Court has yet to review the
issue to determine whether a prisoner's fundamental procreative right exists
during imprisonment.74
65. See id. (recounting the horrific details of plaintiff James R. Scott's attack on a woman in her own
home, which later resulted in her death, leaving the child without a mother).
66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant at 27, Gerber v. Hickman, No. 02-419, (Aug.
16, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. See id. (stating that "approximately [fourteen] years after his only felony conviction as an adult, Mr.
Gerber discharged a gun into his own television set.").
68. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (stating that "[i]t is clear that
among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions 'relating to marriage ... [and] procreation."'); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(concluding that the right to conceive and raise a child is essential to an individual's basic civil rights); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a right to procreate is basic to the continuation of the
human race).
69. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner, 316 U.S. at
535; see generally DeOliveira, supra note 9, at n.82 (discussing various court opinions and their outcomes
involving an inmate's right to procreate).
70. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; see generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1989) (examining the constitutional right to privacy and its link to human sexuality).
71. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
72. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (focusing on constitutional protections of a right of privacy and a woman's
right to choose).
73. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 201.
74. The Ninth Circuit looked to a few Supreme Court cases to guide them in their decision, specifically,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1978) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the Court held
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In Skinner, the Court decided that strict scrutiny was "essential" in reviewing
a statute that provided for compulsory sterilization of certain prisoners. 75 Skinner
illustrates the Court's recognition of procreative rights in the prison context.76
Seemingly, "[flull procreative freedom would include both the freedom not to
reproduce and the freedom to reproduce when, with whom, and by what means
one chooses." 77 The Court, to date, has not explicitly adopted that interpretation.
Since Skinner, the Court has also recognized that a prisoner retains those
constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
legitimate interests related to penological objectives." Recent cases in federal
courts, specifically Gerber v. Hickman79 and Goodwin v. Turner,' involving
artificial insemination requests by inmates, strongly suggest the need for the
Court to resolve the question as to what extent procreative rights survive
incarceration.8'
In Skinner, the Court reasoned that a three-time convicted criminal could not
be subject to forced sterilization under state law.82 The Court stated that "when
the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race."83 Arguably, this would be
analogous to the situation in Gerber since the prisoner is a three-strikes offender,
and without artificial insemination privileges, current prison policy completely
denies any form of procreative rights.
that prisoners have a constitutional right to maintain their procreative abilities for use once released from prison.
This decision emphasized the fundamental right to procreate thereby supporting the notion that prisoners retain
some form of procreative right while incarcerated.
75. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 201.
76. See Davis, supra note 23, at 169 (discussing the "landmark Supreme Court decision acknowledging
prisoners' interest in procreation"). The Supreme Court has not yet looked at the right of procreation in cases
involving a female prisoner's right to choose. Id.
77. See Jack F. Williams, Differential Treatment of Men and Women by Artificial Reproduction Statutes,
21 TULSA L.J. 463, 481 (1986) (focusing on the Supreme Court's decisions surrounding the right to procreate
generally, specifically quoting Professor Robertson's comments on Roe v. Wade and its progeny).
78. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (establishing that courts must weigh legitimate
penological objectives against a prisoner's asserted constitutional right).
79. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2001).
80. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
81. See e.g., Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Percy v. New Jersey, 651 A.2d
1044, 1046 (N.J. 1995) (providing other courts' views on a prisoner's right to artificial insemination);
DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 191 (noting that prison regulations prohibiting prisoners from exercising their
procreative rights via artificial insemination, "as alternative means of procreation bears no rational relation to
the furtherance of any legitimate penological objective and represents an impermissible burden on prisoners'
rights").
82. See Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 536, 539 (1942) (concluding that Oklahoma's statute
providing for the mandatory sterilization of "habitual criminals" was a violation of the fundamental right to
procreate).
83. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
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To sufficiently evaluate the deprivation of a prisoner's fundamental right to
procreate, a court must decide whether this right survives incarceration.
4
Assuming there is a constitutional fight to procreate that survives incarceration,
when a prisoner asserts infringement of that right, the appropriate standard of
review is the Turner four-part test." Therefore, a court will be required to apply
the Turner analysis to determine if the prison's regulation is unjustly infringing
on an asserted right. 6 Although regulation of a prisoner's rights, such as the
right to procreate, is permissible, absolute deprivation of fundamental rights
is unconstitutional.87
Traditionally, courts have not reviewed prison regulations that restrict certain
constitutional rights." Where the prisoner's rights are concerned, "certain jurisdictions
have attempted to severely curtail these rights, while others have allowed them to
remain virtually intact throughout incarceration."89 The underlying objectives of our
penal system justify the retraction of certain rights. 90 The limitations on the
exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from
valid penological objectives including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of
prisoners, and institutional security.9 Courts generally take the position that
trained prison administrators evaluate the penological objectives of their
respective institution.92
As a result, a prisoner keeps only those rights that are consistent with his
status as a prisoner.9 When considering the validity of prison regulations, a court
must first determine whether the Constitution protects the right asserted by the
prisoner and whether that right survives incarceration. 94 Then a court determines
the application of an appropriate level of scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality
of a regulation. 95
84. See Goodwin, 908 F,2d at 1398 (laying out the required analysis, but failing to reach the specific
issue of whether a right to procreate by means of artificial insemination survives incarceration).
85. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
86. Id.
87. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42 (striking down a state statute providing for permanent sterilization
of prisoners on the grounds that the ability to procreate is a basic fundamental right).
88. See Davis, supra note 23, at 170-71 (listing the doctrine of separation of powers, federalism
concerns, lack of judicial expertise in prison administration, sensitivity to the difficulty of prison management,
and general deference to the judgment of prison officials as reasons for the courts' unwillingness to interfere).
89. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 189-90 (citing to section 2601(f) of the California Penal Code
preserving the prisoner's right to marry in support of some jurisdictions keeping fundamental rights intact); see
generally Virginia Hardwick, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison Marriage and
Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1985) (discussing inmates' right to marriage and family visitation).
90. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
91. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-823 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
92. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
93. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
94. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990) (laying out the four-part test described
in Turner v. Safley).
95. Id.
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Certainly, there are some circumstances where prisoners already benefit from
protection of their procreative freedom. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons has established regulations affecting pregnant female prisoners. These
regulations allow a female inmate to chose either to carry the child or to exercise
her right to terminate the pregnancy through abortion. 97 This illustrates that prison
administrators already recognize procreative rights to some degree. In contrast,
there have been various efforts to prevent prisoners from engaging in
reproductive activities.98 From failed attempts to sterilize certain prisoners to
more modern laws banning conjugal visitation rights, lawmakers reflect society's
views on what rights it feels prisoners should be permitted to exercise while
incarcerated.99
The legitimate penological objective standard is used to limit the ability of male
inmates to utilize artificial insemination as an alternate means of reproduction. m Use
of this standard prevents serious repercussions to prison facilities and society in
general by requiring prison officials to present support for their decision to
restrict an inmate's constitutional rights.0° It also acts as a means for courts to
regulate the restrictions imposed behind bars.' z
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CASES INVOLVING INFRINGEMENT OF
PRISONER'S RIGHTS
Prisoners retain the rights to marry, 0 3 to terminate a pregnancy,'14 and to be
free from forced sterilization. Given that this group of specific privacy rights
are "so intertwined, they should be afforded similar protection."'' 6 When an
96. 28 C.F.R. § 551.23(a) (2001).
97. See id. (providing that "[t]he inmate has the responsibility to decide either to have an abortion or to
bear the child."); see also Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3rd
Cir. 1987) (holding that requiring inmates to seek court-ordered releases to obtain an abortion is
unconstitutional).
98. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 203 (discussing procreative issues such as sterilization, and policies
preventing conjugal visitation).
99. See id. (noting society's distain for permitting inmates to create offspring).
100. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (balancing legitimate penological
objectives of the prison facility with the existence of a fundamental right to procreate).
101. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-824 (1974) (analyzing the standard of legitimate
penological objectives and its application to challenges to prison restrictions).
102. See id. at 822 (concluding that asserted constitutional rights of prisoners must be weighed in light
of legitimate institutional objectives).
103. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (stating that "[m]any important attributes of
marriage remain" despite the individual's status as a prisoner).
104. See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 351 (3rd Cir. 1987)
(holding that female inmates may choose to terminate their pregnancies).
105. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1942) (striking down a state statute requiring
mandatory sterilization of "habitual criminals").
106. Edith T. Peebles, Steven J. Goodwin is Doing Federal Time, and We Won't Let Him Be a Father-
The Erosion of the Rights of Federal Prisoners: Goodwin v. Turner, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1165, 1197-98
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inmate claims infringement of a fundamental constitutional right, the judiciary
has the power and duty to intervene in the internal affairs of a prison facility.' °7
The Supreme Court has long maintained that "lawful incarceration brings about
the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights."' ' 8 In
contrast, some courts have expressed the view that a prisoner "retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
taken from him by law."' '° Other Supreme Court cases suggest that a heightened
level of scrutiny may be appropriate for particular prison cases." ° For instance, a
heightened level of scrutiny may be required when the justification for the prison
regulation is a concern other than security."' From these views, differing
standards developed within the Court. However, Turner is the most recent and
wide reaching precedent on the topic.1
In Turner, inmates challenged the constitutionality of certain prison
regulations prohibiting correspondence between inmates at different prisons and
banning inmate marriage."3 The Court presented four factors to determine the
reasonableness of a particular prison regulation.' 4 Under this standard, a court
first determines whether there is "a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.""
5
The second part asks, "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates. " 6 The third part examines "the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally."" 7 Finally, a court
examines the presence or "the absence of ready alternatives" to the prison to
accomplish its penological objectives."' If there are other alternatives to the
regulation, then a presumption of unconstitutional deprivation attaches.
(1991).
107. Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1018 (2d Cir. 1985).
108. See Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (stating that, due to incarceration, prisoners may
face limitations on certain constitutional rights); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (concluding that
rights may only be limited when in conflict with penological objectives).
109. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
110. See Donner, supra note 28, at 1002 (noting the Court's use of heightened scrutiny in Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), dealing with censorship of inmate mail).
111. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989).
112. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
113. See id. at 81 (holding that inmates have marital rights while behind bars).
114. Id. at 89-91.
115. See id. at 89-90 (explaining that, under this factor, "a regulation cannot be sustained where the
logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational").
116. See id. at 90 (stating further that "courts should be particularly conscious of the 'measure of judicial
deference owned to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the regulation."').
117. See id. (concluding that "[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 'ripple
effect' on fellow inmates or prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of
corrections officials.").
118. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 (stating that if an available alternative accommodates the
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Before Turner, courts applied varying levels of scrutiny in prisoners' rights
cases. 19 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court held that, a standard of strict scrutiny
would be proper if there was a deprivation of a fundamental right.2 ° In Turner,
the Court further defined the appropriate standard of review for prison
regulations that infringe on protected constitutional rights.' The standard for
determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on a prisoner's
constitutional rights is to inquire as to whether the regulation is "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests."'' 2 This standard is appropriate even
when the infringed constitutional right is fundamental, and the State under other
circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of
review. ' 3 Moreover, the Court has clearly established that this standard of review
applies to all circumstances in which the rules of prison administration implicate
constitutional rights.' 24 Prisoners retain at least some constitutional rights despite
incarceration with limitations on such rights implemented by prison authorities
who are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration.'
5
These principles of prison policy apply in all cases where a prisoner asserts that a
prison regulation violates the Constitution.26 The Turner court formulated a
standard for the constitutional claims of inmates that was responsive to both the
policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect
constitutional rights.121
Turner offers prison officials enormous flexibility which effectively amounts
to the lowest level of scrutiny for reviewing a constitutional challenge.""z Courts
assess prison regulations under a "reasonableness" test, that is less restrictive
than the standard generally "applied to alleged infringements of fundamental
constitutional rights."' 29 Use of this reasonableness test ensures that courts afford
individual's right at minimal costs to legitimate penological interests, this may indicate that the regulation is an
exaggerated response to prison concerns).
119. Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the "Hands Off"
Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REX'. 219, n.126 (1993) (citing to Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.
1985)).
120. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
121. See 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (adopting a four-part test appropriate for review of prison
regulations).
122. Id.
123. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (comparing the Turner standard with heightened
levels of scrutiny usually appropriate when examining infringement of a fundamental right).
124. See Donner, supra note 28, at 1001 (analyzing the test established in Turner).
125. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (stating that "separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of
judicial restraint" in matters relating to prison policy).
126. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1989).
127. 482 U.S. at 89.
128. See Peebles, supra note 106, at 1196-97 (1991) (pointing to the Court's return to a standard similar
to the "old hands-off approach").
129. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (discussing further the Court's adoption
of a standard of review for prison regulations in Turner).
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appropriate deference to prison officials.' 3 This enables prison officials to
anticipate security concerns and to develop modern solutions to prison
administration.' Moreover, it avoids unnecessary intrusion by the judiciary into
problems particularly unfit for "resolution by decree."' 32
Furthermore, Turner exposes an unwillingness on the part of the Court to
interfere with prison regulations.'33 The Court has faced criticism based on its
implementation of a low level of scrutiny and high amount of deference paid to
prison authorities with regards to the fundamental rights of prisoners.'
Application of the standard seems to "permit disregard for inmates' constitutional
rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security
concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection
between that concern and the challenged regulation."'35 Prison officials may be
better equipped to make administrative decisions and courts may properly show a
measure of deference as a result."' However, when certain decisions inflict
unnecessary limitations on fundamental constitutional rights, courts should
consider themselves compelled to intervene. 137
Arguably, the Turner standard fails to grant the protection necessary to those
fundamental rights retained during incarceration.'38 As the standard in Turner
merely determines the legitimacy of the penological interest and then looks at
whether that interest is reasonably related to the disputed prison policy, "it
ignores the right of the prisoner that is implicated, no matter what the nature of
that right may be."'39 Still, adoption of a heightened level of scrutiny carries the
risk of obstructing the ability of prison officials to "anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration."14°
Based on Turner, a court determining the validity of a prison regulation first
looks to whether there is a fundamental right and, if so, whether it can be
130. Id.
131. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 86 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) on the subject of
prison security as being "particularly within the province and professional expertise of correction officials").
132. Id.; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) (acknowledging the complexity of
problems within the prison system).
133. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 189-90 (discussing the emergence of
constitutional standard of the review for prisoners' rights claims).
134. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 195 (pointing to the arguments of the dissent in Turner).
135. Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 196 (discussing a federal case, Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015 (2d Cir. 1985), cited by the dissent in Turner).
137. See id. (arguing that while prison officials are most qualified to make judgments on prison policy,
courts have a duty to uphold fundamental rights of all individuals).
138. See Peebles, supra note 106, at 1199 (concluding that courts facing prisoners' right claims
consistently shape their analysis based on substantial deference to prison officials).
139. Id.
140. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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protected without negatively impacting legitimate penological interests.141 When
the deprivation of an inmate's right occurs, a court will use the Turner analysis to
determine if denial of that right was unconstitutional. 214  Even if a court
determines that a right survives incarceration, that right may still still be subject
to significant restrictions.
43
The Turner Court held that, when a prison regulation infringed on prisoners'
fundamental rights and did not involve the rights of others, the regulation was not
subject to a standard of strict scrutiny.' 44 In Turner, the Supreme Court ultimately
held that a lesser standard of scrutiny applies in all circumstances in which
regulations supported by legitimate penological interests infringe on constitutional
rights.
14
V. GERBER V. HICKMAN
The Gerbers' battle in the courts began with the filing of a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that the
California Department of Corrections' denial of Mr. Gerber's fundamental right
to procreate constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
substantive due process.' 46 The district court held that inmate Gerber's right to
artificial insemination did not survive incarceration. 147 Not yet discouraged and
fueled by their strong desire to conceive a child, the Gerbers appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
A. The Ninth Circuit
1. Majority
Providing a glimmer of hope to the Gerbers, a three judge panel held that the
development of modern methods of procreation that bypass physical contact with
the prisoner's spouse are not inherently inconsistent with incarceration.' 4 On
September 5, 2001, in the first ruling of its kind, the United States Court of
141. Id.at89-91.
142. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the inmate's request for
artificial insemination under the four-factor test laid out in Turner).
143. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (discussing the possibility that the prison facility may have a legitimate
reason in curtailing certain rights for the benefit of administration).
144. See id. at 81-84 (presenting a particular level of scrutiny to address prisoners' rights claims).
145. See id. at 89 (describing the four-part analysis laid out by the Supreme Court to determine whether
a prisoner's rights have been infringed upon).
146. Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
147. Id. at 1218.
148. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving a male prisoner's request to
transport a semen sample at his own expense, by mail, to a medical facility so that his wife could be artificially
inseminated).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to dismiss
claims involving a prisoner's right to procreate by artificial insemination.' 49 The
Ninth Circuit held in Gerber v. Hickman,50 that the right to procreation survives
incarceration. 5 ' In California, this decision primarily affected life-term inmates
as generally married inmates, not convicted of sex crimes, are permitted the right
to conjugal visitation.'52 In the other eight states under the Ninth Circuit's
jurisdiction whose prisons also do not permit conjugal visitation, this decision
raised concern that courts would be faced with larger numbers of requests.'53
The court utilized a two-step analysis to determine whether the inmate's
substantive due process rights had been violated.'" First, the court considered
whether a fundamental right was involved and whether that right was not
inconsistent with an individual's status as a prisoner.' Next, the court explained
that if the fundamental right at issue survives incarceration, it must be determined
whether there are legitimate penological interests that justify the restriction of the
right by prison officials.'56 However, the court omitted consideration of whether
there were indeed legitimate penological objectives from its analysis of the
existence of a right to procreate.1
57
By utilizing the Turner standard of review, the Gerber Court emphasized the
balance between penological interests and prisoners' procreative rights.'58 The
Ninth Circuit, addressing the motion to dismiss, did not find a valid, logical
connection between the denial of Gerber's right to procreate via artificial
insemination and the penological interest allegedly justifying it. "9
At the district court level, the prison facility forwarded the penological
interests of equal treatment between male and female prisoners, possible safety
risks involved in prisoners sending semen through the mail for the purpose of
artificial insemination, and risk of liability for the prison facility itself relating to
149. See id. at 892-93 (overruling Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2000)).
150. 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001).
15 1. See id. at 888-90 (holding that both Turner and Skinner support the rule that procreation survives
incarceration and that Gerber should have access to artificial insemination).
152. See Bob Egelko, Full Court to Decide on Inmates' Right to Become Dads: Artificial Insemination
was OKd by Panel, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 2001, at A20 (stating that "about one-sixth of the total of 159,000
inmates" are serving life sentences).
153. See id. (reporting the effect that granting artificial inseminations requests could potentially have on
prison facilities outside of California).
154. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 886-87 (focusing on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protections as a
means for inmates to petition the government for redress).
155. See id. (citing to Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
156. See id. (citing to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96-97 (1987)).
157. Recent Case, supra note 15, at 1544-45.
158. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890 (noting that the Turner analysis was not used by the district court
because the court did not recognize that a right to procreate survived incarceration).
159. See id. at 892 (stating that the warden's arguments were in need of further development in order to
determine whether a "total ban" on a prisoner's procreative rights was justified). The Ninth Circuit did not say
that there was not a right to procreate. Id.
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the privilege.' 6 Incidentally, the district court did not even perform the Turner
analysis. The district court held that prisoners lose their right to access a
particular means of procreation during their term of incarceration."' As a result of
the holding on whether a right to procreation exists during incarceration, the
district court failed to discuss whether the prison's refusal to accommodate
artificial insemination requests was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. 6 After applying the Turner analysis and overturning the decision of the
district court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to the lower court with
suggestions as to how the issue of restricting inmates' requests for a means to
procreate should be balanced against the prison's legitimate interests.1
64
In Gerber, the Ninth Circuit panel recognized that the California Department
of Corrections (CDC) may legitimately restrict the exercise of a prisoner's right
to procreate as long as it does so in furtherance of legitimate penological
objectives.16  The CDC argued that denying Gerber's request for artificial
insemination was reasonably related to the legitimate penological objectives of
Equal Protection of male and female inmates, conserving prison resources,
maintaining prison security interests, and preserving inmate rehabilitation.'66
After dismissing the concerns of the prison administration as unreasonable,
the Gerber court held it was unnecessary to consider the other factors making up
the Turner analysis. 67 The court stated that satisfaction of the first factor was
necessary to sustain a prison policy infringing upon constitutional rights 68
While this decision by the three-judge panel did not reject the right of a male
inmate to send a semen sample by mail to a medical facility for artificial
insemination, the court's holding did not characterize the action of procreating
from prison via overnight mail as a constitutional right. 69 At this stage, the panel
160. See id. at 891 (pointing to three arguments reviewed by the court to determine whether the
governmental interests of denying a prisoner his procreative rights were legitimate).
161. See Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 n.4 (concluding that the inmate's right to procreation did not
survive incarceration and noting that "the court need not determine whether defendant's refusal to accommodate
plaintiffs request is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests").
162. Id. at 1219.
163. Id. at 1219 n.4.
164. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 892-93 (overturning the lower court's decision that the right to procreate
did not survive and remanding the case back to the lower court to appropriately utilize the Turner standard of
review).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 885 (presenting the arguments forwarded by the prison officials in denying the request).
167. See id. at 892 n.15 (citing to relevant language in a earlier case utilizing the Turner analysis, Casey
v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1993), where the court had determined satisfaction of the first Turner
factor was "necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, to sustain a prison policy abridging constitutional
rights.").
168. See id. (concluding that the right must first survive incarceration before prison policy is analyzed
under the Turner standard).
169. See id. at 892 (noting that Gerber and his wife are married and would fund the whole procedure at
their own expense).
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required further development of the factual record. 70 The court clearly stated that
the fundamental right to procreate is the right being protected under the
Constitution and that it is a right that exists during incarceration.' The court did
not decide whether the Constitution protected the right via artificial insemination
or any other particular means of procreation.
7 2
The significance of the Ninth Circuit's initial decision in Gerber is rooted in
the court's focus and relevance of the first prong: whether there is a right to
procreate. "3 The two-prong test utilized in Gerber highlights the difference
between the existence of a right and the exercise of that right.'74 The court failed
to analyze the policy concerns and penological interests that strongly influence
whether a right should exist or not.75
In a two-to-one ruling to overturn the lower court, the Ninth Circuit majority
was strongly criticized for its liberal views on prisoner's rights."' The Ninth
Circuit, condemned by conservative groups and frequently reversed by the Supreme
Court, 17 concluded that unless prison officials cite "legitimate penological interests"
for rejecting the inmate's request, there is a right to use artificial insemination as a
means to procreate.77 The court acknowledged that prisoners lose certain rights,
but stated that prison officials must show legitimate reasons for denial of an
inmate's request under these circumstances.1 79 In Gerber, the court found that
prison officials failed to do so.18
VI. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANC
A. The Majority
The Gerbers' battle in the courts faced another disappointing defeat in May
2002. Dashing their remaining hope of conceiving a child via artificial insemination,
170. Id.
171. ld. at 888 n.6.
172. See id. at 892-93 (remanding the case to the lower court for further determination).
173. Recent Case, supra note 15, at 1544-45.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1545.
176. Gerber, 264 F.3d at 892-93.
177. See George F. Will, "A Silly Decision in a 'Seminal' Case", THE BALTIMORE SUN Nov. 8,2001, at
19A (stating that "[i]n the five terms from 1996 through 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed [ninety]
rulings from the Ninth Circuit, and reversed [seventy-seven] of them."); see generally TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
122 S. Ct. 441 (2001); United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001); United States v. Arvizu, No. 00-1519,
2002 U.S. LEXIS 490 (Jan. 15, 2002); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (providing a recent
instance where the Ninth Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court for their liberal views on a prisoner's
rights claim).
178. Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 892 (failing to accept any of the prison officials' arguments as legitimate reasons to deny
the right to procreate).
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the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's ruling that "the right to
procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration."
8 1
The majority again used a two-prong test similar to -the district court."8 2 The
majority first considered whether the right to procreate is fundamentally• .• 183
inconsistent with incarceration. Finding that the right to procreate is indeed
inconsistent in these circumstances, the majority did not reach the second part of
the analysis involving whether the regulation was related to a valid penological• 84
interest.' The outcome was unsurprising.
The majority did address arguments relating to technological advancement.'
However, the fact that artificial insemination could be achieved with ease and
minimal burdens upon the prison facility and personnel was not considered when
arriving at this decision."" The majority's decision focused on the "nature and
goals of the correctional system."'' 7
The majority disagreed with Gerber's use of both Skinner and Turner as support
for his claim of procreative rights while behind bars for life. 8 Distinguishing
Skinner and Turner, the court stated that "the right to procreate while
incarcerated and the right to be free from surgical sterilization by prison officials
are two very different things." '89 In Gerber's particular case, because of his life-
term and desire to father his own biological child, without alternative means of
procreation, this decision amounts to forced sterilization. The court takes a strict
interpretation of the procedure of forced sterilization rather than the actual
outcome' 9° However, the outcome is the same whether Gerber goes under the
knife and undergoes surgical sterilization or instead is prevented from providing
a semen sample to his wife for artificial insemination purposes during his life
sentence. The court offered similarly weak reasoning for why Turner and the
right to marriage while incarcerated also failed in Gerber's case.' 9' While a
marriage may be subject to substantial physical restrictions during incarceration,
this would not be relevant in Gerber's situation, where there was no request or
necessity for physical contact. For Gerber, the physical acts involved with collection
181. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 16, 2002)
(No. 02-419).
182. Id. at 620-23.
183. Id. at 620.
184. Id. at 623.
185. See id. at 622 (discussing issues arising during oral arguments involving such questions as if
"science progressed to the point where Gerber could artificially inseminate his wife as easily as write her a
letter, would this change [the court's] analysis?"). The court plainly stated that "[iut would not." Id.
186. Id.
187. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 (illustrating such goals as "isolating prisoners, deterring crime, punishing
offenders, and providing rehabilitation.").
188. See id. at 622-23 (stating that "Skinner stands only for the proposition that forced surgical
sterilization of prisoners violates the Equal Protection Clause) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 622.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 622-23.
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of his own semen sample are, frankly, common occurrences in every prison
facility housing male inmates.
B. The Dissent
Taking a more common sense approach, five dissenting judges presented
persuasive arguments in support of allowing Mr. Gerber to provide his wife with
a sperm sample.'9' Judge A. Wallace Tashima, writing for the dissent, stated that
"[p]rocreation through artificial insemination... implicates none of the
restrictions on privacy and association that are necessary attributes of
incarceration."'93 The dissent focused on the technological aspects of artificial
insemination distinguishing the procedure from intimate association and its
relevant security risks.'94
Distinguishing Supreme Court cases involving unreasonable searches and
seizures and face-to-face interviews between prisoners and the media, the dissent
pointed to the fact that Gerber's request did not involve the entry of his wife or
others, such as medical personnel into the prison or other conditions that would
be cause for security or administrative concerns.' 95 Interestingly, the warden
cannot prevent prisoners from sending samples of bodily fluids to a lab in order
to establish their innocence. 96 The procedure involved in both circumstances are
the same except for purpose and outcome.'9
Pointing out the majority's failure to identify the reasoning behind the
decision that Gerber's request is inconsistent with the goals of correctional
facilities, the dissent made clear that the Legislature should determine the
purpose behind prohibiting Gerber's request, not the warden.'98 If the purpose
behind prohibiting procreation is to punish offenders, the Legislature must
exercise its law making power to this effect. '99 In California, no statute exists
allowing prison officials to determine whether prisoners can transport a semen
sample outside the prison walls.W
The fact that other prisoners are allowed conjugal visits, which may result in
procreation and offspring, supports the conclusion that procreation is not
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. 20'
192. Id. at 624.
193. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 625.
194. Id. at 629.
195. Id. at 625-26.
196. Id. at 626.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 626.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 626-27.
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Other cases involving similar requests made by prisoners were discussed
within the dissenting opinion.' 2 In Goodwin, an inmate was asking the prison to
provide him with a container and a means to transport. 2°3 In contrast, Gerber
made every arrangement himself, and only asked the prison to mail or let his
attorney transport it outside prison walls.2
VII. LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS RECOGNIZED
BY THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has recognized various legitimate penological interests.
Generally, "preserving institutional order and discipline, maintaining security to
protect against escape or unauthorized entry, and achieving prisoner
rehabilitation" are recognized as legitimate penological interests by the courts
and prison facilities." Lower courts have also focused on specific interests of
individual prison facilities. "While the Court remains ever cognizant of the
obstacles prison officials encounter everyday in overcrowded and understaffed
penal institutions, it also recognizes that it cannot ignore the needs of those
prisoners whose constitutional rights may be overlooked in the process." 206
Institutional security is the principal goal of prison officials. 20 Concerns of
internal security and discipline do not necessarily implicate legitimate
penological interests relating to artificial insemination requests by male
prisoners." Male inmates only require a sterile receptacle and a means of
transporting the sample outside of the prison facility. 2°9 Through use of a modern
technique such as artificial insemination, "[a] male prisoner could fulfill his role
in the artificial insemination process by simply meeting with his doctor and
providing the semen sample."21°
When contrasted with the security concerns of permitting conjugal visitation,
the artificial insemination process presents little more than administrative
211inconvenience. When a prison facility has to provide visitation quarters,
additional security personnel, and cover the administrative costs related to
202. Id. at 628.
203. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1397 (8th Cir. 1990).
204. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619.
205. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (providing a list of legitimate penological
objectives allowing for the deprivation of rights in the prison setting); Davis, supra note 23, at 17 1.
206. See Davis, supra note 23, at 181 n.118 (citing to David Rudovsky who states that
"[i]mplementation and enforcement of these rights [remains] primarily in the hands of prison officials who
continue to struggle to maintain the status quo").
207. DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 207.
208. See Davis, supra note 23, at 190 (arguing that in many cases all that is required is a sterile
receptacle and a means to transport the semen out of the prison facility).
209. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398.
210. DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 208.
211. See id. at 208-09 (comparing existing policy of conjugal visitation with alternative procreative
methods).
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conjugal visitation, allowing male inmates to utilize the artificial insemination
process makes more sense in furtherance of the goal of attaining a secure
facility."'
Generally, costs are always going to weigh against a prisoner's ability to
exercise certain rights. 2" The costs of permitting a male inmate to collect semen
for the purposes of subsequent attempts at artificial insemination outside the
prison walls are insignificant at best.2 4 With increasing technology, current
expenses will start to decrease. Expenses involved in accommodating prisoners'
215constitutional rights cannot justify the complete deprivation of these rights.
Perhaps more pressing are the attendant costs associated with the birth of a
child. The inability of certain prisoners to provide monetary support often leaves
an inmate's wife and new baby to resort to welfare. 2" Even if permitted to
exercise their procreative right, prisoners, due to their incarcerated status, are
211arguably limited in their participation and contact with their future child.
Furthermore, in front of the Ninth Circuit panel, the CDC forwarded
concerns of possible litigation costs related to the allowance of the exercise of
such a right for male but not female inmates.21 The Gerber panel stated that fear
of possible liability is not a justification for denying a prisoner's constitutional
rights.2 9 Considering the amount of litigation that has taken place relating to the
denial of inmates' requests, allowing prisoners to exercise their procreative rights
might present no greater burden than already exists within the prison system.
While permitting Mr. Gerber to exercise his procreative right via artificial
insemination may lead to an increase in claims by other prisoners for the same or
similar privileges, it is questionable whether allowing prisoners to exercise their
procreative rights utilizing modern reproductive methods would have a
substantial impact on prisons and their staff. 22 With the increased use of DNA
databases within the criminal justice system, collection of DNA samples has
become widespread in prison facilities.22" ' Therefore, collection of a semen sample
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891 (discussing that, in this case, the prisoner and his wife have offered to
pay for all expenses involved in the procedure).
215. See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (1988)
(holding that the expense of permitting a female inmate to terminate her pregnancy was insufficient to deny the
right).
216. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 205 (expressing concerns surrounding the costs associated with
choosing to have a child).
217. Id. at 204-05 (questioning how involved a prisoner could really be in the child's life).
218. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890-91 (listing the concerns of the prison facility involved in allowing
male inmates the right to procreate).
219. See id. at 891-92 (stating that fear of lawsuits filed by female inmates does not justify denial of a
constitutional right to prisoners of the opposite sex).
220. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 205-06 (noting that women may file claims along with other male
inmates once certain rights are recognized by prison policy).
221. CAL-DNA FACrSHEET, supra note 41.
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for artificial insemination would have no more impact on the prison than would
collection of a blood or other bodily fluid sample for a DNA database.
Many prisons still permit conjugal visitation decreasing the need for
prisoners to seek other alternatives to the traditional means of procreation.2
2
From a religious perspective, others consider artificial insemination or other
modem techniques as "morally unacceptable" forms of procreation. 23 Further,
those inmates who are only serving limited sentences may not be pressured by
time constraints and could wait until released to start a family. 22 However, if
subject to a life sentence, some inmates will lose these rights permanently .2
Obviously, Mr. Gerber and other life-term inmates cannot wait until their release
226from prison. If not permitted to explore modern techniques of reproduction, a
life sentence becomes one that effectively includes a permanent deprivation of
rights analogous to sterilization."'
VIII. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
A. Male Inmates
There is a potential violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if deprivation of a prisoner's basic rights protected under
the Constitution occurs because of incarceration. 2 Specifically, Equal Protection
concerns arise if prison policies permit only male prisoners to exercise their
procreative rights.29 When prisoners claim an Equal Protection violation based
upon prison policy, federal courts have often applied differing levels of
scrutiny.7  While some courts have properly applied the Turner reasonableness
standard when faced with prisoner's rights cases, others have chosen a
heightened level of scrutiny more appropriate to equal protection claims outside
2311the prison context. Under a heightened scrutiny analysis, a prison regulation is
222. See DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 207 (presenting the fact that many prisons still permit conjugal
visitation).
223. Id. at 206.
224. Id.
225. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882 (stating that Gerber is currently serving a life sentence under
California's three strikes law).
226. See id. (presenting the fact that Mr. Gerber's wife is in her late forties and time is of great concern
in this particular case).
227. See id. (noting that Gerber is serving a life term under California's three strikes legislation for
narcotics and weapons violations).
228. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1942) (addressing the Equal Protection concerns
involved in deprivation of prisoner rights).
229. See Percy v. New Jersey, 651 A.2d 1044, 1046 (N.J. 1995) (addressing the financial burdens and
security concerns of allowing female inmates the right to artificial insemination).
230. See Donner, supra note 28, at 1005 (analyzing the approaches used by various federal courts in
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to use in evaluating the constitutionality of prison regulations).
231. Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see generally Donner, supra note
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constitutional if it is the least restrictive means to accomplish a legitimate
penological objective."' Still, even Turner, the more deferential standard
specifically formulated by the Court to review prisoners' constitutional claims,
will not permit prison officials to infringe upon the fundamental rights of
prisoners without a legitimate basis."' In the Court's view, the Turner standard
responded both to the "policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints
and the need to protect constitutional rights."2M Therefore, in the prison context,
the Turner standard is appropriate even if the case involves a fundamental right
that would otherwise justify a more heightened level of scrutiny.235
Courts have recognized that different treatment of male and female prisoners
does not necessarily violate Equal Protection."' However, equal protection
among both male and female inmates is a legitimate government interest . In
Goodwin, the court held that denial of a prisoner's request for a sterile container
to transport sperm to his wife was a reasonable restriction related to the
legitimate penological interest of equal protection among the prison population.238
The Eighth Circuit created a new legitimate penological interest of equal
treatment."' This particular prison policy had been previously unrecognized by
the Supreme Court.m° The dissent in Goodwin stated that equal treatment did not
qualify as a legitimate penological interest unless it would lead to numerous
requests by female inmates resulting in administrative and financial burdens.'
"Equal treatment is not rationally advanced by denying all inmates a
constitutional right simply because that right might be denied to some on
legitimate grounds."2 42 "[I]n some circumstances, prisons are required to give
support to the exercise of certain rights and, because of special security or
administrative rules, allowed to deny it to others. 'M 3
Some critics believe that "the Goodwin court mistakenly viewed the
impracticality of treating male and female inmates' procreational rights equally
28, at n.24 (citing to additional federal court cases utilizing a heightened level of scrutiny to analyze prisoners'
rights).
232. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
233. See Donner, supra note 28, at 1005-11 (noting that the Goodwin court used the more deferential
Turner standard within its analysis).
234. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406).
235. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
236. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1454-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (focusing on women in the
prison system and their right to not be discriminated against).
237. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399, 1405 (both the majority and dissent agreed on this point).
238. Id. at 1396.
239. See id. at 1399 n.7 (referring to the prison officials' concern behind treating inmates of both sexes
equally).
240. Peebles, supra note 106, at 1189.
241. Goodwin, 908 F.2d. at 1405. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. Peebles, supra note 106, at 1191.
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as justification for the prison's blanket policy." 244 The court expressed concerns
that allowing those requests by male prisoners would force the prison to grant
similar requests to female prisoners.24 Clearly, men and women are not similarly
situated in their reproductive capabilities.2" There are biological differences
between the sexes that could possibly permit the application of different policies
to male and female inmates. 247 "[R]egulations based on real differences between
the sexes, as opposed to cultural stereotypes, can be constitutional."
2
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that the prison's denial of an inmate's
request to artificially inseminate his wife was reasonably related to achieving the
legitimate penological interests of the facility.249 Based on an interest of equal
treatment among both male and female inmates, the court deferred to the
judgment of prison officials. Although male and female prisoners are similarly
situated in status, the dissent in Goodwin argued that male and female prisoners
were not similarly situated in terms of procreative rights and did not have to be
treated as such. 2 Moreover, permitting male inmates to artificially inseminate
individuals outside of the prison system does not necessarily mean that female
prisoners should be afforded the right to be artificially inseminated inside prison
walls to achieve equal treatment.25
Permitting female inmates to utilize artificial insemination "raises significant
institutional concerns not implicated when prison officials allow males to
preserve their sperm. 253 Yet, allowing male inmates to artificially inseminate
their spouse beyond prison walls obviously has different consequences than
permitting a female inmate to be artificially inseminated herself. Institutional
concerns that women prisoners may assert their Equal Protection rights to pursue
their own requests of artificial insemination is insufficient to justify restricting
the constitutional rights of male inmates to procreate.2" However, this leads to an
244. Davis, supra note 23, at 189.
245. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging basic biological differences between the sexes).
246. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891 n.13 (concluding that the policy of treating inmates the same is not
implicated because women cannot provide semen to allow their mate to conceive). The court noted that while
this request perhaps would be more analogous to a female inmate requesting permission to donate an egg to her
lesbian partner, no evidence was presented to the court on this issue. Id.
247. Cf. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging basic biological differences
between the sexes).
248. See Davis, supra note 23, at 189 nn. 176-177 (citing to a number of Supreme Court cases illustrating
the constitutionality of such regulations).
249. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1396.
250. Id. at 1400.
251. Id. at 1406-07 (McMillian, J., dissenting); see Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that different treatment of male and female prisoners does not necessarily violate equal protection).
252. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1406 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
253. Davis, supra note 23, at 189-90.
254. Donner, supra note 28, at 1008.
255. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891-92 (pointing out that previous cases involving male requests for
artificial insemination have not prompted such requests from female inmates); cf Jeri Munsterman, Procreation
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interesting question of whether a more legitimate concern would be a request
256made by a lesbian prisoner to donate an egg to her non-incarcerated partner.
Alternatively, a heterosexual woman may seek to do the same for the purpose of
preserving her eggs or entering into a surrogacy agreement. Still, surgical egg
extraction is a significantly more complicated and burdensome medical
procedure than semen collection.257
If achieved "without having a negative effect on prison security and
resources," male inmates must be allowed to exercise their fundamental right to258
procreate. Denying every male inmate's right to procreate via artificial
insemination does not rationally further a prison's policy of equal treatment of all
inmates. 25' This right can exist without compromising legitimate prison
policies. 260 "While courts generally should mandate equal treatment in the prison
context, they cannot ignore the genuine biological differences that exist between
men and women with respect to procreation. 26'
However, many members of society who obey the law are uneasy about theS 262
prospect of prison facilities allowing prisoners to reproduce. Public policy
favoring two-parent families and encouraging married couples to procreate
263becomes less persuasive when one of the parents is a life-term inmate.
Unspoken policy within prison systems to discourage procreation by any means
264may exist because of perceptions that all prisoners are socially undesirable.
Prisons housing female inmates routinely assist impregnated inmates in
procuring non-therapeutic abortions.26' To some, particularly prison officials, this
exercise of procreative rights does not present quite as many policy concerns.66
From Prison Via FedEx and the Extension of the Right to Imprisoned Women, 70 UMKC L. REV. 733, 734
(2002) (discussing the importance of recognizing the right to procreate for female inmates).
256. See Egelko, supra note 152, at A20 (reporting that a federal appeals court granted a new hearing in
the case of Gerber v. Hickman to determine the right of male inmates to become fathers via artificial
insemination).
257. See generally Rao, supra note 1, at 1081 n. 13 (describing in vitro fertilization as "[requiring] the
surgical removal of eggs after ovarian stimulation, fertilization with sperm in a laboratory, and subsequent
implantation in the uterus."). This supports the assertion that men and women are not similarly situated. In
contrast, a woman can accomplish artificial insemination with simple tools, such "as a syringe or a turkey
baster." Id. at 1081 n. 11.
258. See Donner, supra note 28, at 1007 (presenting arguments as to why a prisoner's right to procreate
should be permitted).
259. Id. at 1012.
260. Id.
261. Davis, supra note 23, at 189.
262. Sarah Tankersley, Reproductive Freedom: Abortion Rights of Incarcerated and Non-Incarcerated
Women, 85 KY. L.J. 219, 239 (1996-1997).
263. See generally id. at 238-40 (presenting policy considerations behind prisoner procreative rights,
specifically focusing on female inmates).
264. Id. at 239.
265. See id. at 238-39 (comparing the ability for an incarcerated female to procure an abortion while
women outside of prison have difficulty obtaining assistance in this area).
266. See id. (hinting to a preference of prison officials to not deal with pregnant inmates within their
facilities because of the extent of care required).
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Continued deference to prison policies may encourage prison officials to create
policies solely to prevent prisoners from exercising certain rights."'
B. Life-Term Inmates
Mr. Gerber is serving a life sentence because of California's three strikes
law.26 A prisoner with "an identical record but whose offense predated the 'three
strikes' law would have received only a five-year enhancement."2 6 Instead, Mr.
Gerber received a sentence of one hundred years to life plus eleven years.270
Therefore, a similarly situated offender with the same criminal record, but
convicted before the enactment of "three strikes," would be eligible for conjugal
271visitation. With only the possibility of a maximum sentence enhancement of
five years, similarly situated offenders could exercise their procreative rights via
conjugal visitation or upon their release from prison 2  If Mr. Gerber had
committed his crime before the law's enactment, conjugal visitation or the
possibility of parole in time to procreate outside of prison likely would have been
273available. Without access to artificial insemination, the Gerbers and other
similarly situated married couples are deprived of their fundamental right to
procreate while those offenders convicted before 1994's three strikes law may
exercise that right.2" The three-strikes law combined with the denial of
Mr. Gerber's request, arguably creates the same result for life-term inmates that
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down in Skinner.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's en banc six-to-five split decision in Gerber illustrates the
need for clarification of the law surrounding a prisoner's right to artificial
insemination. The cold prison bars may separate prisoners from family, friends,
and the rest of the outside world, but they do not separate prisoners from the
275
protection of rights under the Constitution. When the law results in an "utterly
267. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1405 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999).
269. Gerber, 103 F.Supp. 2d at 1218.
270. Id. at 1216.
271. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23, Gerber v. Hickman, No. 02-419,
(Aug. 16, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that "[t]he denial of Mr. Gerber's
request to artificially inseminate his spouse violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by unjustifiably imposing the punishment of permanent deprivation of the right to procreate to one class of
offenders, while allowing exercise of this right to other similarly situated offenders.").
272. Id.
273. Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
274. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23-24, Gerber v. Hickman, No. 02-419,
(Aug. 16, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
275. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (stating that "no iron curtain separates" prisoners
from the Constitution).
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bizarre result that Mrs. Gerber may bear a child with any man in the world except
her husband," it may be time for the California Legislature to step in and clarify
its intent under these difficult circumstances. 27 Across the Nation, not one state
has enacted a statute prohibiting an inmate from artificially inseminating a
spouse.
When such egregious deprivation occurs, as in Gerber, the courts must
discontinue their policy of deference to prison officials. Otherwise, turning a
blind eye to what goes on beyond the prison walls makes law-abiding society just
as criminal as those housed behind those walls. Prison officials regulate prisoners
day after day. In every sense, prison officials determine the total existence of the
human beings that reside within the prison walls.277 Well-established prison
policies tell prisoners when to sleep, wake, work, play, and eat.278 Some must live
for periods without companionship, submit to bodily searches after visiting
hours, or worse. 279 When an individual's constitutional rights are concerned,
prison officials must show that the restrictions placed upon inmates are no greater
that necessary to achieve prison objectives. 2  Courts must face the challenge of
how to best protect the rights retained by those behind the prison walls. 21' A
prisoner may reside within his own cell, but while those bars separate him from
law-abiding society, they do not separate him from the Constitution 22
The Constitution requires accountability when official power absolutely
deprives a person of a fundamental right.23 Incarceration by its nature denies a
prisoner of participation in society. 284 To deny the opportunity to procreate
requires more justification than a mere assertion that any other course of action is
inappropriate. 285 Courts reviewing prisoners' rights claims must consistently
"balance the competing interests of prison administrators, inmates, and [others]
whose constitutional rights are restricted through the enforcement of the prison
276. Henry K. Lee, Inmate Can't Become Dad By Using Mail: Court Rules He Has No Right of
Procreation, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 2002.
277. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming
that prisoners are members of a "total institution" that few civilians can even fathom).
278. See id. at 354-55 (comparing the governmental regulation of the prison population to that of the
general civilian population).
279. Id. at 355.
280. See id. at 355-56 (discussing the difficulties facing prison officials in "preserving security in a
potentially explosive setting" and providing "rehabilitation that prepares some inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream.").
281. See id. at 356 (concluding that the Constitution was not created to promote government efficiency
but to protect individuals from infringement upon their constitutional rights). Justice Brennan further stated that
the "Court's role is to ensure that fundamental restraints on that power are enforced." Id.
282. Id.
283. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (showing support for the standard
developed in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (1985), which requires "more than a demonstration of
'reasonableness' to justify such infringement" upon a prisoner's fundamental rights).
284. See id. at 354-56 (discussing the nature of the prison setting and the need for the elimination of
certain rights to preserve security inside the prison walls).
285. See id. at 354-59 (discussing deprivation of the right to freedom of religion).
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regulations."28 6 Prison policy forbidding artificial insemination interferes with the
intimate relationship between husband and wife. Ultimately, the personal choice
of whether or not to have a child should be left to the individual, not left
arbitrarily to prison officials. 2 7 To infringe on a right so basic and fundamental as
the right to procreate because of an individual's status as a prisoner goes against
those basic freedoms our Constitution protects.
Some suggest that the Turner test is "not adequate to fully accommodate the
assertion of all possible inmate rights" and that a standard is needed "that places
greater weight on the presence of viable alternatives and places a greater burden
on prison officials to justify the regulation depending on the nature of the
asserted right. '" ' Application of this standard clearly demonstrates the
difficulties facing prison inmates who allege violations of constitutionally
protected fundamental rights.
In California, the mere existence of conjugal visitation privileges indicates
that there is a right to procreate while incarcerated. As long as California's prison
system permits conjugal visitation to some inmates but not other specified groups
of inmates, deprivation of one of our most basic rights will continue to occur
behind prison walls. Arguments that the exercise of procreative rights is
inherently inconsistent with incarceration become unpersuasive when inmates
may procreate under prison-operated programs permitting conjugal visitation.
Without clear guidelines and with continued uncertainty, inmates may take the
risk of additional punishment involved in sperm smuggling schemes, in order to
bring a child into their marriage via artificial insemination practices.
By serving a life sentence, life-term inmates are already paying their debt to
society for their wrongdoing. Since traditionally courts have viewed marriage
and procreation as intimately connected, a life-term inmate denied the right to
procreate is essentially deprived of not only his life, but also his opportunity to
create a new life.289 For the Gerbers, although time may have already run out for
their opportunity to conceive a child, they continue their battle in hopes of
pressuring the United States Supreme Court to right the injustice done to life-
term inmates and their families, and permit artificial insemination requests on a
case-by-case basis.
286. Davis, supra note 23, at 165-66.
287. DeOliveira, supra note 9, at 204.
288. See Giles, supra note 119, at 236 (discussing in detail the deficiencies of applying the Turner test).
289. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (illustrating the historical development of the
right to procreate); Turner, 42 U.S. at 78 (addressing the Court's traditional views on marriage and family).

